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FLOWERS 
OF EVIL 
The CIA and the heroin trade 
Ladies and gentlemen," announced the genteel British f diplomat, raising his glass to offer a toast, give you 
Prince Sopsaisana, the uplifter of Laotian youth." 
The toast brought an appreciative smile from the guest erf 
honor, cheers and applause from the luminaries of Vientiane's 
diplomatic corps, assembled at the farewell banquet for the 
Laotian ambassador-designate to France, Prince Sqpsaisana. A 
member of the royal house of Xieng Khouang, the Plain of 
Jars region, the Prince was vice-president of the National 
Assembly, chairman of the Lao Bar Association, president of 
the Lao Press Association, president of the Alliance Franfaise, 
and a member in good standing of the Asian People's Anti-
Communist League. After receiving his credentials from the 
King in a private audience at the Luang Prabang Royal Palace 
on April 8, 1971, he was treated to an ui^ recedented round 
of cockuil parties, dinners, and banquets. For Sopsai, as his 
friends call him, was not just any ambassador; the Americans 
considered him an outstanding eatample of a new generation of 
honest, dynamic national leaders, and it was widely rumored in 
Vientiane that Sopsai was destined for high office some day. 
The final send-off party at Vientiane's Watuy Airport on 
April 23 was CHie of the gayest a&urs of the season. Everybody 
was there; the champagne bubbled, the canape were flawlessly 
French, and Mr. Ivan Bastouil, charg^  d'aftures at the French 
Embassy, gave the nicest speech. Only after the plane had 
soared off into the cbuds did anybody notice that Sopsai had 
forgotten to pay for his share of the recepticoi. 
His arrival at J'aris's Qrly Airport on the morning of April 
25 was the occasion for another reception. The French am-
bassador to Laos, home for a brief visit, and the entire staff of 
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the Laotian Embassy had turned out to welcome the new 
ambassador. There were warm embraces, kissing on both 
cheeks, and more effusive speeches. Curiously, the Prince 
insisted on waiting for his luggage like any or^nary tourist, 
and when his many suitcases finally appeared after an unex-
plained delay, he immediately noticed that a particular one was 
missing. Sopsai angrily insisted that his suitcase be delivered at 
once, and French authorities promised, most apologetically, 
that it would be sent to the Laotian Embassy as soon as it was 
found. Sopsai departed reluctantly for yet another reception at 
th  Embassy, and while he drank the ceremonial champagne 
with his newfound retinue of admirers, French customs of-
ficials were examining one of the biggest heroin seizures in 
French history. 
The Ambassador's suitcase contained sixty kilos of high-
grade Laotian heroin — worth $13.5 million on the streets of 
New York, its probable destination. A week later, a smiling 
French official presented himself at the Embassy with the 
suitcase in hand. Although Sopsaisana had been bombarding 
the airport with outraged telephone calls for several days, he 
suddenly realized that accepting the suitcase was tantamount to 
an admission of guilt and so, contrary to his righteous in-
dignation, he flatly denied that it was his. Ignoring his 
declaration of innocence, the French government refuted to 
accept his diplomatic credentials, and Sopsai remained in Paris 
for no more than two months before he was recalled to 
Vientiane. 
Fragile flower, cash crop 
Despite its resemblance to comic opera, the Prince Sop-saisana affair offered a rare glimpse into the workings of 
the Laotian drug trade. That trade is the principal business of 
Laos, and to a certain extent it depends on the support (money, 
guns, aircraft, etc.) of the QA. Unfortunately, the questions 
raised by the Prince's disgrace were never a^ed, much less 
answered. The French government overlooked tfie em-
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The followmg morning the congesltd opium sap is collecud from the 
bulb's surface with a iwudl tbovtUike tool and csrried in a xmsU 
container uorn around tha nack. barrassment for dipiomatk reasons, the ifitenuitional press 
ignored the story, and the UnitedSutes Embassy demonstrated 
a remarkable disinterest in the entire subject 
Over the past fifty yeafs, Lj»s has become something of a 
free port for ophim. The delicate opium poppy grows abun 
dantly at high c^vations in the northern mountains, and under 
a sequence dt different regimes (French, American, Laotian), 
the hill tribesmen have been encouraged to cultivate the poppy 
as the principal cash crop. Opium dens can be fc>und in erery 
quarter of Vientiane, and the whereabouts of the opium 
refineries are a matter of common knowledge. The leiKiing 
citizens, whether princes, generals, or politicians, zeakmsly 
control the drug traffic and regard it, with good reason, as a 
strategic industry. 
The Laotian tndifterence to Prince Sopsaisana's misfcrtunc 
therefore becomes easily understandable. The reticence of the 
American Embassy, however, requires a few words of ex-
planation. Sopsai had allegedly received his sixty kilos of heroin 
through the kind offices of a particularly aggressive Laodan 
^eral named Vang Pao. Vang Pao also happens to be the 
commander of the CIA secret army in northeastern Laos. He 
has commanded that army since 1961, and during the past 
eleven years he has become an increasingly notorious en-
trepreneur in the Laotian drug trade. 
But the American Embassy remains ciuSously unaware of 
his involvement in the narcotics traffic. Nobody has any in-
formation on the operation of the Laotian drug business^  iad 
Embassy officials appear to have adopted an attitude of bmgn 
ne>»Iect That attitude was characteristically expressed in a 
letter written in December 1970 by Ambassador G. McMurtie 
Godley to a journalist inquiring about the opium traffic. Godfey 
wrote 
» 
Tfhf purchase of opium in Southeast Am is certtMjf y 
less difficult than in other p^rts of the worU, hui I belhm^ 
the Royal Laotian Got^mment takes its respomsUfUky 
seriously to prohibit international opttm traffic^... 
However. Idlest in format ton available to me ifuBetMd 
John Ev^ringr^am 
that all of Southeast Asia produces only of narcotics 
which are, unfortunately, illegally imported to Great 
Britain and the U.S. As you undouhiedly are already 
aware, our government is making every effort to contain 
this traffic and I believe the Narcotics Bureau in 
Washington D C can give you additional information tf 
you have some other irufuiries. 
Ambassador Godley did not deem it worthy of mention that 
the latest information available to him should have indii ated 
that the ^eat majority of heroin being used by American GIs 
in Vietnam was coming from Laotian laboratories. Nor did he 
deem it necessary to mention two other facts: 
• In J 967 the United Nations reported that poppy tarnMTS in 
northeastern Burma, northern Thailand, and northern Lios — 
a region known as "the Golden Triangle ' -- were producing 
1,000 tons of raw opium annually, which was then about 70 
per cent of the world's supply. The available evidence indicates 
that the exports have increased, and that heroin from the 
Golden Triangle is tKyw being shipped into the United States 
through Europe and South America. 
• During the last several noonths dt 1970 more American sol 
diers were evacuated as casualties from South Vietnam for drug-
related reasons than fc)r reasons having to do with war wounds. 
To Americans living in cities plagu^ by heroin, it may seem 
controversial, even shocking, that any U.S. Government 
agency would ignore the international dnig traffic. But when 
considered in the perspective of historical precedent, and 
conceding the demands of mountain warfare in northern Laos, 
the U.S. Embassy's tolerant attitude seems almost inevitable. 
Rather than sendfng U.S. combat troops mto Laos, four 
successive American Presidents and their foreign policy ad 
\isers worked through the CIA to build the Meo guerrillas of 
northern Laos into the only effective army in Laos. The fim 
damental reason for American involvement in any aspect of the 
Laotian opium traffic lies in these policy decisions, and they can 
be understood only in the context of the secret war in Laos, a 
war in which Vang Pao emerged as one of the principal figures 
CIA operations with Meo guerrillas began in 19^9 as part of a regional intelligence*gathering program. Noting with 
alarm renewed guerrilla activity in South Vietnam and Laos 
in the late 19^0s, American intelligence analysts mterpreted 
these rt*ports as the first signs of communist plans for the 
"subversion and conquest'' of Southeast Asia. General Ed 
ward G. Lansdale, who directed much ot the Defense 
Department's strategic planning on Indxhina during the early 
years ot the Kennedy Administration, recalls that these hill 
tribe operations were set up to monitor communist in 
filtration:'*The main thought was to have an early warning, 
trip wire sort of thing with these tribes in the mountains 
getting intelligence on North Vietnamese movement. This 
would be a part ot a defensive strategv of saving the rice 
producing lowlands of Thailand and Vietnam by sealing oti 
the mcHintain infiltratk)!! routes from China and North 
Vietnam ' 
While the U.S. mihtary sent half a million troops to hght in 
South Vietnam, the mountain war has required only a handhii 
of U S personnel. ''I always Wt," General Lansdale told me, 
''that a small group of Americam organizing the kxral 
population was the way to counter cxmimunist wars of national 
liberation." In South Vietnam, computenred command 
decisions and automated firepower dehumanized the fighting, 
while the rapid roution of U.S. personnel made military 
commanders seem like replaceable parts in a giant machine. 
However, American paramilitary personnel serving in Laos 
have tended to serve long tours of duty, some a decade or moct, 
and have been given an enormous amount of personal power. , 
Since there were too few U.S. operatives to assume cocnplete 
responsibility for daily operations in the hills of Laos, the OA 
usually selected one leader from every hill tribe as its surrogitte 
commander. The CIA's chosen ally recruited his 
tribesmen as mercenaries, paid their salaries with CIA moQCjr, 
and led them m battle. Because the CIA had only as mocfa 
influence with each tribe as its surrogate comraander, k Wt ki 
the agency's interest to make these men kxal despota ijr 
concentrating military and economic power i 
i-
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Golden Triangle region 
In the Meo region of northern Laos, the CIA had the good fortune to find, in Vang Pao, a man with unlimited 
ambitions and a willingness to take battlefield casualties For 
Vang Pao, peace is a distant, childKXxl memory. He saw battle 
for the first time in 1945 at the age of thirteen, while working as 
an interpreter for French commandos who had parachuted onto 
the Plain of Jars to organize anti Japanese resistance. In April 
1954 he led 850 hill-tribe commandos through the rugged 
mountains of Sam Neua Province in a vain attempt to relieve 
the doomed French garrison at Dienbienphu. 
When the first Indochina war ended that same year, Vang 
Pao returned to regular duty in the Laotian Army He ad 
vanced quickly to the rank of major and was appointed com 
mander of the Tenth Infantry Battalion, which was assigned to 
tht mounuins east of the Plain of Jars. While he had a good 
record as a wartime commando leader, it was in his new 
command that Vang Pao first (Hsplayed the personal corruption 
that would later make him such a despotic warlord. 
In addition to his regular hstud&xi, Vang Pao was also 
commander of Meo self-defenae kmm in the Plain of Jars 
regiofi. Volunteers had been pixmised regular aUocments of 
food and money, but Vang P«o pocketed these salaries, and 
most volunteers went unpaid for months at a time. When one 
Meo lieutenant demanded thai the irregukn be given their 
back pay, Vang Pao shot him in the leg. That settled the matter 
for the moment, but several months later the rising chorus of 
complaints finally came to the attention of the provincial army 
commander, Col. Kham Hou Boussarath. In early 1959 
Cokwiel Kham Hou called Vang Pao to his headquarters in 
Xieng Khouang, confronted him with the accusations, and 
ordered him to pay up. Several days later Cofonel Kham Hou 
was driving back from an inspection tour of the frontier areas 
and was approaching the villa^ of Lat Houang, when a burst of 
machine-gun fire shattered his windshield More than thirty of 
Vang Pao's soldiers hidden in the brush alongside the road 
were shooting frantically at the automobile. But it was twilight, 
and most of the shots went wild. Kham Hou floored the ac 
celerator and emerged from the gauntlet unscathed. 
As siK»n as he reached his headquarters, Colonel Kham Hou 
radioed a hill report to Vientiane. The next morning Army 
Chief of Staff Ouan Rathikun arrived in Xiesig Khouang and 
summoned Vang Pao.* Weeping profusely, Vang Pao 
prostrated himself before Ouan and begged tor forgiveneaa. 
Perhaps touched by this display of emotion or influenced by the 
wishes of U.S Green Beret officers working with the Mco^  
Ouan decided not to punish Vang Pao. However, most c^  the 
Laotian high command seemed to feel that his career was 
fimshed. 
t Vang Pao was to be rescued from obscurity by unforeseen 
" circmnstances that made his services invaluable to the 
Laotian right wing and the CIA. In the weeks that followed, 
Laos blundered into one of its chronic civil wars. Vang Pao 
volunteered his Meo irregulars to the cause of the tottering 
regime, and, as a reward, he was pardoned and promoted. 
In January 1961 the CIA began sending Green Berets, CIA 
financed Thai police commandos, and a handful of its own 
agents to Vang Pao's headquarters at Padong, a 4,000-foot 
mountain due south of the Plain of Jars. The object was to build 
up an elective secret army that wouki keep the Pathet Lao 
bottled up on the Plain of Jars by recruiting all of the eligible 
young Meo in the surrounding mountains as commandos. 
Using Padong as a base of operations, Vang Pao*s officers and 
CIA operatives flew to scattered Meo villages in helicopters and 
light Helio Courier aircraft. Offering guns, rice, and money in 
exchange for recruits, these advance men leapfrogged from 
village to village around the western and northern perimeter of 
the Plain. Under their supervision, dozens of crude landing 
strips for Air America aircraft were hacked out ctf the oKHinuin 
forests, and scattered villages were Unked with CIA 
headquarters at Padong. Within several months, Vang Pao's 
influence extended from Padoag north to Phou Fa and east as 
far as Bouam Long. 
One kxial Meo leader in the Long Pot region west of the 
Plain of Jars says that Meo officers who visited his village 
following General Koog Le*s capture of the Plain used threats 
as well as inducements to win a declaration of foyalty. *'Vang 
Pao sent usguns/'heiwralkd. wedid not accept his guns, 
he would caU us Pathet Laa We had no choice. Vang Pao's 
officers came to the viUage and warned that if we did not }oin 
htm he would regard us as Pathet Lao, and his soldiers would 
attack our villafe.'' 
By 1964 Vang Pao had extended his aathohcy northward 
into Sam Neua Province, openly attacking Pathet Lao 
•Gen Ouan Rathikun deserves passing mcfnorialixation in this 
account A former comnnanding officer of the Royal Laotian Armv ~ 
the only army in the world apart from our own that is wholly hnanced 
by the American uxpayer — he so brilliantly acquitted himsell in that 
post to earn his ct)untry's highest decoration, the Grand Cross of the 
Million Elephants and the White Parasol. A round and man, 
the General has also controlled, since 1962, an elephant's share of 
that part of the opium traffic through Laos that originates in Thailand 
and the Shan states of northern Burma. Tithing this traffic has bea^-" 
immensely profitable to the various right wing governments diat 
Ouan has ser\'ed so faithfully over the years, yiekiiog revenues cf 
almost SKK),000 a nrK)nth even as early as 1962. And, like llit 
subordinate Vang Pao, General Ouan also rouily perceived 
splendid opportunities available to entrepreneiKY of apil 
By 1970 he allegedly controlled the brgeat laboMaay ia: 
Asia, refining some of the purest heroin in the worli. 
> 
Afr 4 met tea helicopttf Isndi at s M$o village in northern Laos. 
The loiai milUary commands asserts that Gtn^rd Vm£ F^'s AfjO 
officers have been shipping op$um o$U of tha vUUge on Air 
America heluopters stnce 
strongholds with the continued assistance ol the QA. (His 
ofiensives took place after the United Sutes had signed the 
Geneva agreements whereby it promised not to interfere in 
Laotian military affairs.) As soon as a village was captured and 
Pathet Lao cadres eliminated, the inhabitants were put to work 
building a crude landing strip, usually 500 to 800 feet tong, to 
receive the airplanes that followed in the conqueror's wake, 
carrying ''refugee" supplies of rice and guns. These gcxxk 
were given away in an attempt to buy the hearts and minds of 
the Meo and eliminate any remaining loyaky to the Pathet Lao. 
Within a matter of months a fifty-mile long strip of territory — 
stretching from the northeastern rim of the Plain of Jars to 
Phou Pha Thi mountain, only fifteen miles from the North 
Vietnamese border — had been added to V«ig Pao's domain 
More than twenty new aircraft landing strips dotted the 
conquered corridor, linking Meo villages with the new CIA 
headquarters at Long Cfteng. Moat of the* Meo villages were 
perched on steep mountain ridges overkxking valleys and 
towns controlled by the Pathet Lao. The Atr America landing 
strip at Hong Non, fc>r esuunple, was ooly twelve miles from 
the limestone caverns near Sun Neua City where the Pathet 
Lao later housed their national headquarters, a munitions 
factory, and a cadre training school. 
Airlining opium 
^ might be expected, the fighting on the Plain of Jars and the 
a V opening of these lancfing strips produced changes in 
northwstern Laos's opium traffic. For over sixty years the 
Plain of Jars had been the huh of the opium tradt^  there. After 
every winter's opium harvest, Chinese merchajus would leave 
their stores on the Plain and ride into the surrounding hills to 
barter for Meo opium. During the colotiial era, Chinese traders 
sold opium to the French Opium Monopoly or to smugglers 
headed for northern Vietnam When the Frt-nch military 
became involved in the opium traffic in the early 1950s, the 
Chinese sold opium to French ( ommantlos tor shipment ii-
Saigon on military transports. After the Frcnch departure in 
1954, Chinese merchants dealt with Corsican charter airlines, 
which made regular flights to Vietnam and the Gulf of Siam. 
No longer able to hold on the Plain of Jars, the Corsican 
airlines began using Air Americans mountain landuig strips to 
pick up raw opium. As Vang Pao circled around the Plain and 
advanced into San) Neua Province, the Corsicans were right 
behind in their Beechcrafts and Cessnas, paying Meo fanners 
and Chinese traders a tQ|> price. Rather than deliver their opium 
to trading centers on the Plain, most traders brought it to Air 
America landing strips serviced by the Corsican charter hnes. 
But when the l4K)tian government fc>rced the Corsicans out 
of business m 196 .^ a serious economic crisis kxxned in the 
Meo highlands. The war had in no way reduced Meo depen 
dence on upium ds a cash crop and may have actually inc reased 
production Assured ol iood supplies from the CIA, the Meo 
had given up growmg net so that they could allot more land to 
the growing of opium. 
While Meo viUafes on the southern asd western edges of the 
Plain were little aSecird by the transport praUem, the end of 
the Corsican flights made it impnaiibif for villages on the 
northern perimeter and in Sam N m Province to market their 
opium Air America was the only form of air transport 
available, and, according to Gen. Ouan Rathiimn and G^. 
Thai Ma, then commander of the Laotian Air Force, it began 
flying Meo opium to markets in Long Cheng and Vientiane. 
Air logistics for the opium trade were further improved in 
1967 when the QA and USAID (United States Agency for 
International Development) gave Vang Pao financial assistance 
m forming his own private airline, Xieng Khouang Air 
Transport. The company's president, Mr. Lo Kham Thy, says 
the airline was formed in late 1967 when two C47s were 
acquired from Air America and Continental Air Services. The 
i.ompany*s schedule is limited to shuttle flights between 
Cheng and Vientiane that carry relief supplies and m ^ 
casional handhil of passengers. Financial control il ihHid bf 
Vang Pao. his brother, his cousin, and his fatfacT-ilhliw. 
Atiording to one tormer AID employee, AID supported tint 
\ 
piroj^t because officials hopc^ cl it would make 1 orikj (..heni> tht-
commercial center oi the northeast and, thereby, reintorcc 
Vang Pao's political position. I lio USA ID officials tnvolved 
apparently realized that any commercial activity at lon^ Chcn^ 
would involve opium, but deaded to support the proje^ 
anyway. 
Tjverybody continued to profit from the various arrangements 
until early 1968, when the Pathet I-ao began the first of the 
dry-season crffensives that eventually, by late 1971, forced Van>^  
Pao's army into a narrow stretch of hill country within a 
relatively few miles of Vientiane. But the only people who lost 
by the military retreat were the Meo hill tribesmen. According 
to reliable Laotian sources, despite the drop in Meo opium 
production after 1%8, Vang Pao was able to continue his role 
in Laos's narcotics trade by opening a heroin laboratory at Long 
Cheng, the CIA headquarters town. 
The loss of Sam Neua Province in 1968 signaled the first of 
the massive Meo migrations that transformed much of north 
CxtffMfW Vsng PaOf commmUtr of the CIA's fntfcenmr^ amy 
%n Lfos's Miiitsry Region 11. 
eastern I aos into a dept^ piilated free fire rone and drastically 
reduced hill triht opium production Hetore the CIA initiated 
Me<i ijnerrilla ope rations in I960, nonheastern Laos had had a 
hill triiy^  j»pulation of about 250,000 people, most of whom 
wre Meo >pium tarmers scattered evenly acro&s the rugged 
highlands 
When \ ang Pao began ro lose control of Sam Neua in early 
19C>8, the CIA dtaded to deny the population ro the Pathet Lao 
by evacuating alFthe Meo tribesmen under his c ontrol By 1%7 
U S Air Force Ix^ mbing in northeastern Laos was already 
heavy, and Meo tribesmen were willing to leave their villages 
rather than face the daily horror of life under t^ >e bombs. By 
early 1970 an estimated 50,000 hill tribesrnen were living in 
Sam Thong and Long Cheng while 100,000 more were 
crowded into a crescent-shaped piece o< territory lying between 
these two cities and the Plain of Jars. 
During i^ ieir 1970 offensive. North Vietnamese and Pathet 
Lao troops tumped off from the Plain of Jars, drove across the 
Meo ''refugee'' areas, and by March were on the heights 
overlooking Sam Thong. As the attacks gained nK)mentum, 
Meci living west of the Plain fled s<^ uth, and eventually more 
than 100,CXX) were rekxated in a forty-mile-wide strip of 
territory l)etween Long Cheng and the Vientiane Plain. When 
the Pathet Lao and the North Vietnamese attacked Long Cheng 
during the 1971 dry season, the QA was ferced to evacuate 
some 50,000 mercenary dependents from Long Cheng valley 
into this overcrowded resettlement area. By mid 1971, USAID 
estimated that almost 150,000 hill-tribe refugees, of whom 60 
per cent were Meo, had been resettled in the Ban Son area 
south of Long Cheng. 
After three vears of constant retreat, Vang Pao's Meo 
followers were at the end of the line. Once a prosperous people 
living in small villafes surrounded by miles of fertile, 
uninhabited mountains, 90,000 Meo, almost a third of all the 
Meo in Laos, were now packed into a fcxty-mile-kxig dead end 
perched above thr swetering Vimiiane Plain. Tracfitionally the 
Meo have built their villages on mountain ndges more than 
3,000 feet in elevation where the temperate climate is con 
diKMve to poppy cultivation, the air is free of malarial 
mosquitoes, and ihe water is piH*. Since nKJft refugee villages 
in the Ban Son resettlemem area are less than 2,500 teet in 
efevation, many Meo, lacking normal immuiitties, have l>een 
stricken with malaria and have become seriously ill. The lower 
elevation and cftvwded conditions make opium culuvation 
almost imposaibfe, and the Meo are totally dependent on Air 
America's rice drops. If the North Vietnamoc and Pathet Lao 
capture Long Cheng and advance on Vientiane, the Meo will 
probably be forced cfown onto the Vientiane Plain wheie their 
extren^ vulnerability to tropical disease might result in a niajor 
medical disaster. 
The Ban Son resettlement area is the guardian at the gate, 
blocking any enemy advance on Vientiane. If the Pathet Lao 
and North Vietnamese choose to attack the Laotian ad-
ministrative capital after they have taken Long Cheng, they 
will have to fight their way through the resettlement area Meo 
leaders are well aware of the daaiger and have fdeaded with 
USAID to either begin resettling the Meo on the Vientiane 
Plain on a gradiial, controlled basis or shift the resettfemeot 
area to the east or west, out of the probable line of ao enemy 
advance Knowing that the Meo fight better when their 
families are threatened, USAID had refused to flcxrcpt^ 
alternative and seems intent on keeping them in ill 
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area for a final, bloody stand against the North Vietnamese and 
Pathet Lao. Most of the Meo have no desire to (onimue 
fighting for Vang Pao. They bitterly resent his more iV^-
boyant excesses -his habit of personally executing his 
soldiers, his willingness to take excessive casualties, and his 
massive grafting from the military payroll - -and regard him a^  a 
corrupt warlord who has grown rich from their suffenng. But 
since USAID decides where the rice is dropped, the Meo have 
no choice but to stand and fight. 
Deranged priorities 
^T^he chronicle of American complicity in the Laohan drug 
^ trade ends with one final irony. When President iNixon 
issued his declaration of war on the international hcrom traffic 
in mid-1971, the U.S. Embassy in Vientiane was finally forced 
to take action. Instead of trying to break up drug syndicates and 
purge the government leaders involved, however, the Embassy 
introduced legal reforms and urged a police crackdown on 
opium addicts. A new <i>pium law submitted to government 
ministries for consideration on June 8 went tnto effect on 
November 15. As a result of the new law, VS, narcotics agents 
were allowed to open an office in early November—two full 
years after GIs started using Laotian heroin in Vietnam and six 
months after the first large seizurw were made in the United 
Sutes. Only a few days after their arnTml, U.S. agents received 
a tip that a Filipino diplomat and a Chinese bminessman were 
going to smuggle heroin directly into the United States. U.S. 
agents boarded the plane with them in Vientiane, flew halfway 
. I round the world, and arrested them with 15.5 kilos of high 
grade heroin in New Yoric City. Even though these men were 
carrying a large quantity of heroin, they were still only 
messenger boys for the powerful Laotian drug merchants. But, 
so far, political expediency has been the order o^  the day, and 
the U.S. Embassy has made absolutely no ettort to go after the 
men jt the top. 
In the long run, the AmericaD effort seems to be atmed at 
closinii Vientiane's hundreds of wide-open opium dms and 
making life difficult for the average Laotian drug user (most ot 
whom are opium smokers). The Amehcans are pressuring the. 
Laotian pobce into launching a massive crmcMomn on opium 
smoking, and there is evidence that the campaign is getting 
under way. Since almost no money is bring made available for 
detoxification centers or outpatknt clinics, naost d Vientiane's 
opium smokers will be rorced to bacome heroin users. 
(Opium's cumbersome smoking paraphernalia and strong 
smell make its addicts much more vubieraUe to arrest.) 
Vientiane's brand of low-grade heroin seems to be particularly 
high in acid content and has produced some horribly debilitated 
zombie addicts. No less an authority thim General CXian 
believes that Vientiane's brand of low grade heroin can kill a 
healthy man in less than a year, h would indeed be ironic if 
America's antidrug campaign drove Laos's opium smokers to a 
heroin death while it left the manutacturers and international 
traffickers untouched. 
After pouring billions of dollars into Southeast Asia for over 
twenty years, the United Sutes has acquired enormous power 
in the region. And it has used this power to create new nations 
where none existed, to handpick prime ministers, to topple 
governments, and to crush revolutioas. But U.S. officials in 
Southeast Asia have always considered the opium traffic a 
quaint local custom and have generally turned a blind eye tp 
official mvolvem# t^. A Laotian or Vietnamese general who 
whispers the word **neutralism'' is likely to find himself on the 
next plane out of the cfHintrv , hut one who teds the in-
trmational press about tiis role in the opium trade does not 
even rmrrn a raised eyebrow. However, American involvennent 
has gone tar btyond coincidental complicity, i^ bassies have 
consciously covered up invohfcmnt by client i^ernments. 
QA contract airhnes have re|iortedy carried opmm, and 
tnifividual CIA men have abetted the opium tralic 
As a result of direct and imirect Atnefican invohfcmem 
opium production has steadily incfeased, hmh-grade heroin 
f^ oduction IS flourishing^ and die Golden Triangke't poppy 
fields have liecome linked to markrts lo Eun>pe and the United 
States Southeast Asia's GoUkn Triangle already grows per 
cent of the world's iliidt opium and u capable of supplying the 
U S. with unlimited quamitses of heroin fcr generatioQt to 
corm- Unless .somethiog is (tone to change America's polides 
and priorities in Southeast Asia, the drug crisis wtU dee^ and 
the heroin plague will continue to spread G 
Above U^l for Tig^r mUth^ CU^ ^mU No. 4 i^^rom 
(90 tn 9<> P^ C0mi m ikt GoUUn Trtmngle 
rtj^ton. hsiki packMg€ (oUmm§ 7,' of s kdogntm Bo$h thti hranJ 
itnd tht Double LJ-O Gio^ kfmd m^ pmth^i^d fof export to 
tin Unite J V/<i/#i and for isU to Amsrtum Ch serving $n 
Somtif yt0tn4tm. 
Below Uk^i tor Oi»mkU V O Gif>k9, dto So. 4 k€ro$n m^u 
fa^tured in lir Golden TrtmgU regkm Almost JJ hmlk herutn 
iiitzmres tn %omtb VtHn^ mr of this krmd On Navem^er 11 
19-!, the (rs Bnmmmo^ N^tf^i ^mamd $f ^ mdlM>nu>r*ih of 
DombU V O Globe hrmns hfrfum m H^ in 
York Cay 
